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Impact Statement 
In this study, we focused on feedback processing and the FRN, as well as subsequent P3b ERP component. We 
found that the FRN size was similar for worse- and better-than-expected events, suggesting that salience probably 
drives the detection of mismatches between outcome and expectancy. Following the FRN, the P3b was selectively 
increased for positive feedback when outcome and expectancy mismatched. These results are compatible with a 
two-stage PM model, according to which the early detection of violations between action and prediction at the FRN 
level is followed by an update of the positive feedback’s value at the P3b level. 
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Abstract 
Converging evidence in human electrophysiology suggests that evaluative feedback provided during 
performance monitoring (PM) elicits two distinctive and successive ERP components: the Feedback-
Related Negativity (FRN) and the P3b. Whereas the FRN has previously been linked to reward prediction 
error (RPE), the P3b has been conceived as reflecting motivational or attentional processes following the 
early processing of the RPE, including action value updating. However, it remains unclear whether these 
two consecutive neurophysiological effects depend on the direction of the unexpectedness (better- or 
worse-than-expected outcomes; signed RPE) or instead only on the degree of unexpectedness irrespective 
of direction (i.e., unsigned RPE). To address this question, we devised an experiment in which we 
manipulated the objective reward probability and the subjective reward expectancy (via instructions) in a 
factorial within-subject design, and explored amplitude changes of the FRN and the P3b. Sixty-four 
channel EEG was recorded while 32 participants performed a speeded Go/NoGo task in which evaluative 
feedback based on the reward probability either violated expectancy (thereby creating a RPE) or did not. 
This violation corresponded either to better- or worse-than-expected events. Results showed that the FRN 
was larger when RPE occurred than when it did not, but irrespective of the direction of this violation. 
Interestingly, in these two conditions, action value was updated for the positive feedback selectively, as 
shown by the P3b amplitude. These results obey a two-stage model of PM assuming that unsigned RPE is 
first rapidly detected (FRN level) before the positive feedback’s value is updated selectively (P3b effect). 
 
 
 
Keywords: ERP; FRN; P3b, P3a, Performance Monitoring; Reward Prediction Error (RPE); Action Value 
Updating; Unexpectedness 
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1. Introduction 
Performance monitoring (PM) is a very important mental ability, which is essential to foster goal-adaptive 
behavior and self-regulation (Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014). PM is 
fairly complex and likely involves different computations, performed at different levels within a 
hierarchical system implemented in the prefrontal cortex and inter-connected dopaminergic regions 
located deeper in the brain, including the basal ganglia and the striatum (Ullsperger, Fischer, Nigbur, & 
Endrass, 2014). Although this process is rather sophisticated, it is also flexible and dynamic, using either 
internal/motor-related cues or external/feedback information depending on the evidence available, with 
the aim to extract the current action value, and update it in case outcome and expectation mismatched with 
each other. Feedback processing guiding PM is clearly visible when these internal cues are lacking, or 
when processing of these cues is incomplete. For example, if uncertainty about an action’s value is high at 
the time of response onset, then evaluative feedback provided after the response helps to reduce it and is 
preferentially processed. The electrophysiological correlates of these dynamic PM effects have been 
studied extensively in the past, and well-defined ERP components have been identified. At the response 
level, the Error-Related Negativity (ERN; see Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; 
Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993) has been put forward as the first stage following action 
execution that allows to detect mismatches between action and goal or prediction. At the feedback level, 
when external-based PM operates, the Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) is usually considered as the 
counterpart of the ERN, sharing many similarities with it. The FRN is a phasic, negative-going wave, 
peaking around 250–300 ms after feedback onset over fronto-central locations along the midline. Its 
amplitude is larger for negative relative to positive performance feedback (Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997; 
Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & Coles, 2004; von Borries, Verkes, Bulten, Cools, & de Bruijn, 2013), and 
for unexpected compared to expected events (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons 2007; Pfabigan, 
Alexopoulos, Bauer, Lamm, & Sailer, 2011). Hence, valence (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006) 
and expectedness (Ferdinand, Mecklinger, Kray, & Gehring, 2012) are two main ingredients that account 
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for the generation of the FRN during PM (see also San Martin, 2012). Expectedness is related to 
expectancy or the degree to which a person expects to receive a certain feedback following her action: If 
expectancy to receive a positive feedback is high/low, the occurrence of a negative feedback or the 
absence of a reward will be unexpected/expected.  
However, the functional meaning or specific contribution of the FRN to PM remains debated in 
the literature (Hajihosseini & Holroyd, 2013; Proudfit, 2015; Ullsperger, 2017; Ullsperger et al., 2014). 
Notably, the type of unexpectedness driving the FRN amplitude modulations remains unclear. According 
to the dominant reinforcement learning framework (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), the FRN is primarily 
generated when the outcome is worse than expected, which means that a ‘signed’ or directional reward 
prediction error (RPE) occurs. A clear FRN is usually observed when the outcome is worse than expected 
(negative RPE): Participants expect the outcome to be rewarding (e.g. monetary gain), but it unexpectedly 
turns out to be non-rewarding. A smaller and weaker FRN is observed when the outcome is better than 
expected (positive RPE): Participants expect the outcome to be non-rewarding but it unexpectedly turns 
out to be rewarding. In the former situation, it is postulated that the outcome (i.e., feedback) is especially 
informative for the participants because it allows to improve learning and adapt behavior accordingly, 
while this is less the case in the latter situation (Frank, Seeberger, & O’reilly, 2004; Sambrook & Gosslin, 
2015; Walsh & Anderson, 2012). At slight variance with this theory, the salience prediction error account 
(SPE; Alexander & Brown, 2011; Oliveira, McDonald, & Goodman, 2007) suggests that the medial 
prefrontal cortex, and more specifically, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which is thought to be 
the main intracranial generator of the FRN (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997; Yeung, 
Holroyd, & Cohen, 2004), is sensitive to mismatches regardless of their sign, thereby responding equally 
strongly to better-than-expected or worse-than-expected outcomes since they are both salient (Hauser, 
Iannaccone, Stämpfli, Drechsler, Brandeis, Walitza, & Brem, 2014; Soder & Potts, 2018; Talmi, 
Atkinson, & El-Deredy, 2013; van der Veen, van der Molen, van der Molen, & Franken, 2016). The 
question thus remains unsolved whether the FRN codes for a signed or an unsigned RPE.  
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In the current study, we sought to address this question. To this end, we devised a within-subject 
experiment in which four main experimental conditions were created by crossing reward probability (low 
or high across different blocks), and expectancy based on specific instructions (low or high across 
different blocks as well). These two main factors were embedded in a factorial design. As a result, 
participants performed the exact same simple decision-making task in four different contexts that differed 
regarding reward probability and expectancy. More specifically, participants performed this task and 
expected it to be relatively easy (i.e., yielding many positive feedbacks) or more difficult instead (i.e., 
resulting in a lower number of positive feedbacks received). Crucially, unknown to them, this prior 
expectation was either confirmed or violated by adjusting reward probability in a blockwise fashion, 
leading eventually to better- or worse-than-expected outcomes. According to the reinforcement learning 
account (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), the FRN, defined as the difference wave between negative and positive 
feedback, should be the largest in the condition where the positive feedback is expected but the outcome 
eventually violates this expectation and a negative feedback is provided instead (i.e., worse-than-expected 
event). Alternatively, if salience is the key feature underlying the generation of prediction errors at the 
FRN level (Hauser et al., 2014; Oliveira et al., 2007; Soder & Potts, 2018; Talmi et al., 2013), then this 
ERP component should be equally large for better-than-expected and worse-than-expected outcomes. 
Translated to a statistical analysis applied to this factorial design, both frameworks predict a significant 
interaction effect between reward probability and expectancy, but the interactions take different shapes in 
each framework. In the reinforcement learning account, the interaction reflects the modulation (increase) 
of the FRN amplitude for a specific or unique combination of probability (low) and expectancy (high) for 
negative feedback. In the salience account, two combinations of probability and expectancy (i.e., when 
they mismatch with each other, but irrespective of the direction of this deviation) both lead to an equally 
large (and statistically undistinguishable) FRN component. 
Noteworthy, when PM is based on the processing of external evaluative feedback, it does not 
terminate at the offset of the FRN. Following the FRN, evaluative feedback usually elicits a clear P3b at 
posterior parietal leads along the midline (Ullsperger et al., 2014). Whereas the FRN is thought to reflect 
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an early evaluation process during which the correspondence between action and goal is processed, the 
subsequent P3b translates this information into specific attentional, motivational, or perhaps working 
memory (WM) processes (Donchin & Coles, 1998; Polich, 2007; Verleger, 1997; Verleger, Jaskowski, & 
Wauschkuhn, 1994). A prominent proposal is that the P3b component reflects action value updating 
during PM after detection of a mismatch between action and goal (Ullsperger, 2017; Ullsperger et al., 
2014). Many previous ERP studies on PM have focused primarily on the FRN (see Sambrook & Gosslin, 
2015; San Martin, 2012) but only a few of them have also explored this subsequent action value updating 
process at the P3b level. Usually, a larger P3b is observed for unexpected than expected action outcomes 
(von Borries et al., 2013). In addition to unexpectedness, it is typically found that negative feedback gives 
rise to a larger P3b than positive feedback (de Bruijn, Mars, & Hulstijn, 2004; Fischer & Ullsperger, 2013; 
Walentowska, Moors, Paul, & Pourtois, 2016; but see Hajcak et al., 2007; Severo, Walentowska, Moors, 
& Pourtois, 2017, 2018 for a reversed pattern; as well as Yeung & Safney, 2004 for the lack of a valence 
effect), suggesting that action value updating likely depends on both expectedness and valence, as well as 
on the context within which this updating takes place. The second goal of our study was to assess action 
value updating at the P3b level when different combinations of reward probability and expectancy were 
created and compared. Based on earlier studies, we hypothesized a larger P3b for unexpected feedback, 
especially if it was negative. Hence, we surmised a stronger updating of the action value for worse 
compared to better-than-expected outcomes. 
In the current study, participants performed a speeded Go/NoGo task that was previously used and 
validated extensively in different EEG studies in the past (e.g. Aarts & Pourtois, 2012; Koban, Pourtois, 
Bediou, & Vuilleumier, 2012; Severo et al., 2017, 2018; Vocat, Pourtois, & Vuilleumier, 2008; 
Walentowska et al., 2016; Walentowska, Paul, Severo, Moors, & Pourtois, 2018). We chose this specific 
task setting as it allowed us to introduce subtle variations in reward probability across different blocks 
without changing the stimuli or task demands between them. Using this procedure, we could create two 
experimental conditions where reward probability was either low (conservative cutoff, resulting in about 
30%) or higher (lenient cutoff, reaching about 50%). In addition to reward probability, we tweaked 
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expectancy in one or the opposite direction. More specifically, we instructed participants before each 
block about its putative reward probability level, and created thereby clear expectations about the 
encounter of positive feedback. Participants were told that positive feedback was either hard or easy to 
get, leading in turn to a low or high reward expectancy, respectively. Crucially, we then created four 
different conditions by crossing these two independent variables (probability and expectancy), and 
alternated block order across participants to control for unwanted fatigue or habituation effects. As a result 
of this factorial design, participants eventually encountered in some blocks low reward probability with 
this Go/NoGo task when reward was either expected or unexpected, and likewise, a higher reward 
probability with the same task in different blocks when reward was either expected or unexpected. 
Participants’ subjective ratings about the positive and negative feedback after each block were used as the 
main manipulation check of reward expectancy. As mentioned earlier, we pitted two sets of predictions 
against each other to assess whether the FRN (and P3b) captured either a signed RPE or instead an 
unsigned RPE during PM in this task. For each of these two components separately, we also estimated the 
underlying intracranial generators using a standard source localization algorithm to confirm that non-
overlapping cortical regions gave rise to them. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
To estimate the sample size, we used G*Power 3.1.9.2 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), 
and referred to the observed effect size of the interaction effect in the time window of the FRN component 
in our previous study as prior (Walentowska et al., 2016). A sample of 33 participants was estimated to 
achieve a power of 0.95, with the significance level set at p = 0.05 1. Thirty-three healthy adult subjects 
were therefore recruited and participated in exchange of 30 Euro compensation. One participant was 
removed from further analyses due to noncompliance to the task instructions and excessive movements 
                                                          
1
 The specific parameters chosen to run the power analysis are available in the Supplementary Materials section. 
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throughout the whole task. The final sample consisted of 32 participants (10 men; mean age: 20.96; SD = 
2.69) 
2
. All were right-handed (assessed using self-reports), and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
They were free of neurological or psychiatric history and of psychoactive medication use. They all gave 
written informed consent prior to the beginning of the experiment. The study was approved by the local 
ethics committee (Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University). 
2.2. Experimental paradigm and procedure 
A speeded Go/NoGo task, which was previously validated in different EEG studies (Aarts & Pourtois, 
2012; Koban et al., 2012; Severo et al., 2017, 2018; Vocat et al., 2008; Walentowska et al., 2016, 2018) 
was used in the current study. Cues, targets, and non-targets consisted of an arrow presented in the center 
of the screen against a white background. Each trial started with a fixation cross (1,000 ms). Then, a black 
arrow (‘cue’), oriented up or down, was presented. After a variable interval (1,000−2,000 ms), this black 
arrow changed color and turned into either green or turquoise, while its orientation could remain either 
identical or switch. When the black arrow turned green and the orientation remained unchanged (‘target’), 
participants were instructed to press a predefined key on the response box as fast as possible with the 
index finger of their right hand (‘Go trials’). However, participants had to withhold responding when 
either the arrow became green but flipped orientation, or when it became turquoise and kept its initial 
orientation (‘non-targets’ in ‘NoGo trials’). In the absence of motor responses, targets and non-targets 
remained on the screen for 1,000 ms. At the onset of the motor response (correct: ‘hits’; incorrect: ‘false 
alarms’), a colored frame (blue or magenta) appeared around the target stimulus, and was presented for 
1,000 ms to indicate to participants the registration of a motor response and the imminent presentation of 
the evaluative feedback. Following that, an evaluative feedback was presented. It consisted of a colorful 
dot that was either green (for positive feedback) or red (for negative feedback) and that was displayed in 
the center of the screen for 1,000 ms (see Figure 1 for the trial structure).  
                                                          
2
 In two participants, the EEG data from one condition (out of four) were not recorded properly due to excessive 
movements and artefacts. Instead of simply removing the whole data sets of these two participants, we replaced the 
missing values with the condition-specific mean amplitude computed for the group of participants. 
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Participants were given positive feedback (green dot) when they responded both correctly and fast 
to Go trials (‘fast hit’) or when they correctly withheld responding to NoGo trials (‘correct inhibition’). 
They were given negative feedback (red dot) when the response to Go trials was correct but too slow 
(‘slow hit’), when they gave a response to NoGo trials (‘false alarm’), or when there was no response to 
Go trials (‘omission’). We used an online adaptive algorithm to set up a limit for correct and fast RTs (i.e., 
response deadline procedure) in Go trials. At the beginning of the experiment, the RT limit was set to 300 
ms (based on previous pilot testing; Vocat et al., 2008). This limit was adjusted online (i.e., after each 
trial) as a function of the immediately preceding trial history, more specifically, as the mean of the current 
and previous RTs. Responses that were slower than this limit were classified online as slow hits (and 
followed by negative feedback), while responses that were faster than the limit were coded online as fast 
hits (and followed by positive feedback). The advantage of this algorithm is that uncertainty about current 
RTs is high throughout the task (given the fluctuations of RTs), which motivates participants to actively 
attend to the evaluative feedback presented after each response (on the Go/target stimulus) to infer 
whether their actions were timely (fast hits) or not (slow hits). Moreover, the response deadline was 
updated throughout the experiment in order to avoid habituation or fatigue, and it was set up in such a way 
that correct and fast responding to Go trials was fairly difficult to achieve (Aarts & Pourtois, 2012; Dhar 
& Pourtois, 2011; Dhar, Pourtois, & Wiersma, 2011; Koban, Pourtois, Vocat, & Vuilleumier, 2010; 
Koban et al., 2012; Vocat et al., 2008). When correct inhibitions, omissions, or false alarms occurred, 
participants could use internal PM to extract the value of their actions, with effects visible at the ERN or 
CRN (response) level mainly, but not at the FRN/P3 level since the evaluative feedback becomes 
uninformative and highly redundant in these situations (see Koban et al., 2012, for a clear demonstration). 
Therefore, in this study, we selectively focused on the FRN and P3 components in response to evaluative 
feedback following fast and slow hits (Go trials).  
Similarly to our previous study (Walentowska et al., 2016), we adapted the online algorithm to 
determine the response cutoff in order to create two versions of the task that differed in terms of reward 
probability. In some blocks, a strict response cutoff was used whereby reward (i.e., fast hits) had a low 
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probability (about 30%). In other blocks, a more lenient cutoff was used with a reward probability that 
increased up to 50% (see Walentowska et al., 2016 for details). Thus, the low and high reward probability 
conditions corresponded to 30% and 50% positive feedback, respectively. Orthogonally to the 
manipulation of reward probability, we manipulated reward expectancy at the start of each block. We 
created specific expectations about the upcoming blockwise reward probability using written instructions 
presented at the beginning of each block, as well as a visual cueing technique. After a training session that 
gave the participants a general overview of the speeded Go/NoGo task, participants were instructed that 
the experiment would be divided into two consecutive parts that differed with regard to the probability of 
receiving positive feedback. More specifically, they were told that they could expect positive feedback to 
be delivered with either low or higher probability, thus creating low and high reward expectancy for these 
two parts, respectively. Participants were therefore not confronted with the actual number for the reward 
probability that was expected in the following part, but only with a rough estimate of it. In addition, 
participants were told that the color of the frame appearing around the target stimulus upon motor 
response (blue or magenta, depending on the condition) would signal which reward probability would 
apply. A blue frame signaled a low reward probability whereas a magenta frame signaled a high reward 
probability. This mapping between color frame and expectancy was counterbalanced across participants.  
The experiment consisted of a training session with 32 trials, followed by 12 experimental blocks, 
each including 56 trials (40 Go and 16 NoGo trials). Go and NoGo trials were presented in a random order 
within each block. These twelve blocks were divided into two parts according to reward expectancy (low 
or high). Unbeknown to the participants, the 6 blocks composing one part were further divided into two 
sub-parts (with 3 consecutive blocks for each of them), depending on reward probability. In this way, a 
factorial design was devised where effects of expectancy and reward probability (as well as their possible 
interactions) on the FRN and the P3b could be explored systematically. The order of the two main parts 
was counterbalanced across participants. Further, in each part, the two reward probabilities were also 
alternated across participants. Hence, 16 different versions of the experimental procedure were created, 
and participants were randomly assigned to one of them at the beginning of the experiment, so that each 
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version of the procedure was used twice (given that we had 32 participants). Stimulus presentation and 
response recording were controlled using E-prime software (V2.0., http://www.pstnet.com/products/e-
prime/). 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
Participants completed subjective ratings after each triplet of blocks, hence in between each of the 
four conditions. Participants were asked to evaluate the expectancy of positive and negative feedback in 
the preceding blocks, as well as how informative this feedback was by means of specific Visual Analog 
Scales (VASs). More specifically, they were asked to rate: (i) how expected was the positive feedback, (ii) 
how expected was the negative feedback, and (iii) how informative was the feedback on average in the 
last three blocks. Each scale ranged from 0 (not expected/informative at all) to 100 (expected/informative 
a lot). These subjective ratings served as indirect manipulation checks of reward expectancy. 
2.3. EEG acquisition and ERP analyses 
Participants were seated in a dimly lit, sound-attenuated, and electrically shielded cabin. Continuous EEG 
was acquired at 512 Hz using a 64-channel (pin-type) Biosemi Active Two system 
(http://www.biosemi.com), referenced online to the Common ModeSense (CMS)–Driven Right Leg 
(DRL) ground. All electrodes were placed according to the extended International 10-20 EEG system 
using an elastic head cap. The vertical and horizontal EOG were monitored by means of four electrodes, 
placed above and below the right eye and on the outer canthi of both eyes, respectively. 
ERPs of interest (FRN and P3b) were computed offline following a standard sequence of data 
transformation (Keil, Debener, Gratton, Junghöfer, Kappenman, Luck, Luu, Miller, & Yee, 2014) using 
BrainVision Analyzer 2.0 software: (i) 50-Hz notch filter; (ii) rereferencing of the EEG signal using a 
common average reference; (iii) -500/+1,000 ms segmentation around the onset of the feedback stimulus; 
(iv) pre-stimulus interval baseline correction (from -500 ms to feedback onset); (v) vertical ocular 
correction for blinks (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983); (vi) semi-automatic artifact rejection (trials with 
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motor artifacts were rejected, with a fixed criterion of ±80 μV) 3; (vii) averaging of the feedback-locked 
ERPs for each type of feedback separately; and (viii) low pass digital filtering of the individual average 
data (30 Hz) 
4
. 
In accordance with previous ERP studies focused on feedback-based PM (Aarts & Pourtois, 2012; 
Bismark, Hajcak, Whitworth, & Allen, 2013; Ferdinand et al., 2012; Fischer & Ullsperger, 2013; Pfabigan 
et al., 2011; Severo et al., 2017, 2018; von Borries et al., 2013; Walentowska et al., 2016; Walsh & 
Anderson, 2012), as well as the electrophysiological properties of the current data set (see Figure 3), the 
FRN was defined as the mean voltage within 250–300 ms after feedback onset over frontal and fronto-
central electrodes along the midline (Fz and FCz pooled together). The P3b amplitude was measured as a 
mean voltage between 350 and 600 ms after feedback onset at centro-parietal and parietal electrodes (CPz 
and Pz pooled together). Moreover, feedback-locked ERP waveforms revealed the existence of another 
positive component occurring prior to the P3b but immediately after the FRN, with a fronto-central scalp 
distribution, hence sharing many similarities with a P3a component (see Figure 4 and Results). This 
fronto-central positivity peaking around 400 ms (P3a) was scored and defined as the mean voltage 
appearing 350–470 ms after feedback onset at the same locations as used for the FRN (Fz and FCz pooled 
together). 
2.4. Source localization  
                                                          
3
 After artifact rejection, the following number of trials were retained for averaging per condition: low reward 
probability-low reward expectancy (M = 30.23, SD = 2.52 for positive, and M = 61.11, SD = 2.44 for negative 
feedbacks), low reward probability-high reward expectancy (M = 29.51, SD = 1.52 for positive, and M = 59.89, SD = 
2.13 for negative feedbacks), high reward probability-high reward expectancy (M = 50.32, SD = 1.92 for positive, 
and M = 48.12, SD = 2.12 for negative feedbacks), and high reward probability-low reward expectancy (M = 47.97, 
SD = 1.72 for positive, and M = 50.03, SD = 2.11 for negative feedbacks) condition. Both low reward probability 
conditions were matched for the number of positive, t(31) = -1.18, p = 0.211, and negative, t(31) = -0.38, p = 0.631 
feedback trials retained for averaging. Comparably, in both high reward probability conditions, a similar number of 
trials was used after artifact rejection for positive, t(31) = -1.57, p = 0.317, and negative feedback, t(31) = 0.59, p = 
0.616. 
4
 Similarly to other studies conducted in the same laboratory (see Walentowska et al., 2016, 2018), we refrained from 
using a high-pass filter or detrend function because the EEG data were recorded using active electrodes and in a 
booth that was shielded from external noise and electromagnetic interference, and the raw signals were eventually 
not distorted. 
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In order to estimate the neural generators underlying previously identified ERP components, a distributed 
linear inverse solution was used, the standardized low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography 
(sLORETA; Pascual-Marqui, 2002). SLORETA solutions are computed within a three-shell spherical 
head model, which is coregistered to the MNI152 template (Mazziotta, Toga, Evans, Fox, Lancaster, 
Zilles, & Mazoyer, 2001). SLORETA estimates the 3-D intracerebral current density distribution within a 
5-mm resolution. The 3-D solution space is restricted to the cortical gray matter and hippocampus. The 
head model uses the electric potential field computed with a boundary element method applied to the 
MNI152 template (Fuchs, Kastner, Wagner, Hawes, & Ebersole, 2002), and the scalp electrode 
coordinates on the MNI brain are derived from the international 5% system (Jurcak, Tsuzuki, & Dan, 
2007). Separately for each ERP component, positive and negative feedback were compared during the 
exact same interval (with a mean activity), as used for the standard ERP data analysis (see here above). 
We used paired-sample t-tests performed on the log-transformed data, and as in our previous studies, we 
set the level of significance for all source localization analyses at p < 0.01 (see also Schettino, Loeys, 
Delplanque, & Pourtois, 2011; Schettino, Loeys, & Pourtois, 2013). 
2.5. Statistical analyses 
Behavioral and ERP data were submitted to separate repeated-measures ANOVAs including the within-
subject factors reward EXPECTANCY (low vs. high) and reward PROBABILITY (low vs. high). For the 
manipulation checks, we also used feedback VALENCE (positive vs. negative) as an additional factor, 
and for the behavioral data we used RESPONSE (fast vs. slow hit) as an additional variable.  
For the ERP data, we computed and used difference waveforms to reduce the number of factors 
eventually entered in the statistical analyses (see Luck & Gaspelin, 2017). For each subject and condition 
separately, the ERP activity for positive feedback was subtracted from that for negative feedback. The 
ERP components of interest (i.e., FRN, P3a and P3b) were measured on these difference waves (see also 
Figure 5). The resulting amplitude values were submitted to repeated-measures ANOVAs including the 
within-subject factors reward EXPECTANCY (low vs. high) and reward PROBABILITY (low vs. high). 
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In an auxiliary analysis, we also included VALENCE as an additional factor to investigate whether 
positive or negative feedback underwent a systematic change depending on EXPECTANCY and 
PROBABILITY. For this analysis, the ERP components of interest (i.e., FRN, P3a and P3b) were scored 
and measured from the individual waveforms obtained for positive and negative feedback. 
Significant (at p < 0.05; see section 2.4) main or interaction effects are reported first, followed    
by post-hoc paired t-tests when applicable. Statistical analyses were run using SPSS 24 for Windows and 
JASP 0.7.5.6 (Love, Selker, Marsman, Jamil, Dropmann, Verhagen, & Wagenmakers, 2015) software.  
3. Results 
3.1. Manipulation checks 
Manipulation checks confirmed that reward expectancy was effective and successful. The ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of EXPECTANCY, F(1,31) = 5.38, p = 0.027, ηp
2 
= 0.148, as well as an 
EXPECTANCY x VALENCE interaction, F(1,31) = 56.12, p < 0.001, ηp
2 
= 0.644. In the two low reward 
expectancy conditions, participants expected less positive than negative feedback, t(31) = -4.25, p < 0.001 
(see Figure 2A). In comparison, in the two high reward expectancy conditions, participants expected 
positive feedback more often than negative feedback, t(31) = 5.57, p < 0.001. These two effects were not 
influenced by the actual reward probability encountered (neither the main effect of PROBABILITY, nor 
interaction effects with PROBABILITY were significant, all ps > 0.327). 
With regard to informativeness, the ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
PROBABILITY, F(1,31) = 4.12, p = 0.049, ηp
2 
= 0.134, as well as a significant interaction between 
EXPECTANCY and PROBABILITY, F(1,31) = 5.25, p = 0.031, ηp
2 
= 0.147. The main effect of 
EXPECTANCY was not significant (p = 0.145). Post-hoc t-tests showed that feedback’s informativeness 
increased when the outcome was worse than expected (M = 67.51, SEM = 2.63) compared to the 
corresponding high expectancy-high probability condition (M = 53.13, SEM = 4.34), t(31) = 2.57, p = 
0.011. The symmetrical effect was not found: Feedback’s informativeness did not increase when the 
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outcome was better than expected (M = 53.22, SEM = 4.26) compared to the corresponding low 
expectancy-low probability condition (M = 54.78, SEM = 3.95), t(31) = -0.15, p = 0.713.  
[insert Figure 2 here] 
3.2. Behavioral results  
Behavioral results confirmed that the speeded Go/NoGo task yielded the expected proportion of fast 
relative to slow hits depending on the actual reward probability (i.e., strictness of the response deadline) 
used (see Figure 2B). The ANOVA showed that the main effect of RESPONSE was significant, F(1,31) = 
11.41, p = 0.004, ηp
2
 = 0.233, as well as the RESPONSE x PROBABILITY interaction, F(1,31) = 72.61, p < 
0.001, ηp
2
 = 0.712. When reward probability was low, irrespective of expectancy, slow hits clearly 
outnumbered fast hits, and participants had approximately 33% of fast hits followed by positive feedback 
and approximately 66% of slow hits followed by negative feedback, t(31) = -1.72, p = 0.017. In 
comparison, when reward probability was increased, fast and slow hits were balanced, amounting to about 
50% each, irrespective of expectancy again, t(31) = 0.72, p = 0.477 (see Figure 2B). 
3.3. ERP results 
3.3.1. FRN 
The ANOVA showed a significant EXPECTANCY x PROBABILITY interaction, F(1,31) = 9.07, p = 
0.009, ηp
2 
= 0.213. Neither the main effect of EXPECTANCY (p = 0.209), nor of PROBABILITY (p = 
0.794) was significant. To test our a priori hypothesis, we performed post-hoc comparisons. They showed 
that the FRN (computed as a difference wave between positive and negative feedback; see Methods) was 
larger when the expectancy and outcome mismatched (M = -2.53 μV, SD = 1.52) compared to when they 
matched (M = -1.44 μV, SD = 1.71), t(31) = -3.32, p = 0.002. However and critically, the RPE captured by 
the FRN amplitude did not differ between trials with a worse-than-expected outcome (M = -2.72 μV, SD = 
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2.31) and those with a better-than-expected outcome (M = -2.16 μV, SD = 2.09), t(31) = 0.66, p = 0.479 
5
 
(see Figures 3 and 5A&B). Moreover, control analyses (see Supplementary Materials section) confirmed 
that these results could not easily be explained by an imbalance between conditions in the number of trials 
included in the averages. When signal-to-noise ratios between conditions were matched by selecting a 
subset of the trials corresponding to negative feedback, almost identical results were found.  
 When entering VALENCE as an additional factor in the ANOVA, results showed a significant 
main effect of VALENCE, F(1,31) = 57.09, p < 0.001, ηp
2 
= 0.648, as well as a significant VALENCE x 
EXPECTANCY x PROBABILITY interaction, F(1,31) = 7.35, p = 0.011, ηp
2 
= 0.192. To break down this 
significant 3-way interaction, we ran 2-way ANOVAs, separately for each valence. For the positive 
feedback, the EXPECTANCY x PROBABILITY interaction was significant, F(1,31) = 7.01, p = 0.013, ηp
2 
= 
0.184. This interaction translated a more positive FRN amplitude when outcome and expectancy 
mismatched with each other (M = 1.56 μV, SD = 2.22), compared to when they were aligned (M = 0.89 
μV, SD = 2.43), although this difference failed to reach significance, t(31) = 1.38, p = .175. In comparison, 
for negative feedback, the FRN amplitude was similar regardless of whether the outcomes mismatched (M 
= -0.72 μV, SD = 2.11) or matched with expectancy (M = -0.55 μV, SD = 3.29), as revealed by a non-
significant EXPECTANCY x PROBABILITY interaction, F(1,31) = 0.41, p = 0.529. 
[insert Figure 3 here] 
3.3.2. P3a 
The ANOVA showed a significant EXPECTANCY x PROBABILITY interaction, F(1,31) = 8.78, p = 
0.006, ηp
2 
= 0.233. Main effects of PROBABILITY (p = 0.061) and EXPECTANCY (p = 0.282) were 
non-significant. Post-hoc t-tests showed that the P3a (defined as the difference between positive and 
negative feedback; see Methods) was larger when reward probability was low and compatible with 
                                                          
5
 To validate the lack of difference in FRN amplitudes between the two mismatching conditions (i.e., better- or 
worse-than-expected outcomes), we ran a complementing analysis by performing a Bayesian Paired Samples T-Test. 
The estimated BF10 was 0.221, suggesting weak support in favor of a statistical difference between them (Raftery, 
1995). 
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expectancy (M = 2.34 μV, SD = 2.47) compared to a better-than-expected outcome (M = -0.32 μV, SD = 
2.29), t(31) = 2.94, p = 0.006. More specifically, the P3a was larger for negative (M = 3.66 μV, SD = 3.07) 
compared to positive feedback (M = 1.32 μV, SD = 3.85), when reward probability was low and it was 
expected (see Figures 4A and 5C). By comparison, the amplitude of the P3a was negligible and did not 
differ between trials in which both reward probability and expectancy were high (M = 0.72 μV, SD = 
2.99) and those with a worse-than-expected outcome (M = -0.05 μV, SD = 3.32), t(31) = -1.32, p = 0.195. 
 When including VALENCE as an additional factor, the ANOVA showed a significant VALENCE 
x EXPECTANCY x PROBABILITY interaction, F(1,31) = 5.44, p = 0.026, ηp
2 
= 0.149. However, none of 
the two separate 2-way ANOVAs showed a significant EXPECTANCY x PROBABILITY interaction (for 
positive feedback, F(1,31) = 2.38, p = 0.136; for negative feedback, F(1,31) = 2.53, p = 0.121). 
[insert Figure 4 here] 
3.3.3. P3b 
The ANOVA showed that the EXPECTANCY x PROBABILITY interaction was significant, F(1,31) = 
8.43, p = 0.007, ηp
2 
= 0.214. Main effects of EXPECTANCY (p = 0.257) and PROBABILITY (p = 0.712) 
were not significant. In agreement with the hypothesis of action value updating following early error 
prediction, the P3b (defined as the difference between positive and negative feedback; see Methods) was 
larger when outcome and expectancy mismatched (M = -1.18 μV, SD = 2.51) than when they matched (M 
= 0.21 μV, SD = 2.61), t(31) = -2.92, p = 0.006. Importantly, the P3b amplitude did not differ for trials with 
a worse-than-expected outcome (M = -1.06 μV, SD = 2.58) and a better-than-expected outcome (M = -
1.31 μV, SD = 2.77), t(31) = -0.63, p = 0.598 
6
 (see Figures 3 and 5A&B). Irrespective of the direction of 
expectancy violation, P3b amplitudes were systematically larger for positive (M = 2.85 μV, SD = 3.25) 
than negative feedback (M = 1.67 μV, SD = 3.18), t(31) = 2.12, p = 0.007.  
                                                          
6
 A Bayesian Paired Samples T-Test revealed that the BF10 was 0.249, indicating weak support for a statistical 
difference between these two conditions. 
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When including VALENCE as an additional factor, the ANOVA showed a significant VALENCE 
x EXPECTANCY x PROBABILITY interaction, F(1,31) = 10.79, p = 0.003, ηp
2 
= 0.258. To break down 
this significant 3-way interaction, we ran 2-way ANOVAs, separately for each valence. For positive 
feedback, the EXPECTANCY x PROBABILITY interaction was not significant, F(1,31) = 1.39, p = 0.246. 
The P3b amplitude was similar irrespective of whether the outcome mismatched (M = 2.22 μV, SD = 
3.31) or matched with expectancy (M = 2.03 μV, SD = 3.01). In comparison, the EXPECTANCY x 
PROBABILITY interaction was significant for negative feedback, F(1,31) = 6.06, p = .021, ηp
2 
= 0.1.64. 
The P3b was reduced when the outcome and expectancy mismatched (M = 1.21 μV, SD = 2.14) compared 
to when they matched (M = 2.71 μV, SD = 3.62), t(31) = -2.43, p = .023. 
[insert Figure 5 here] 
3.4. Source localization results 
For the FRN, the statistical comparison in the inverse-solution space between positive and negative 
feedback (run for both conditions with violated expectancy), revealed a widespread suprathreshold 
activation within the medial prefrontal cortex, which was stronger for negative than positive feedback. 
More specifically, a main cluster was located within the midcingulate/anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 
overlapping with Brodmann areas (BAs) 24, 32, 33 (see Figure 5E, upper panel). Its maximum was 
located at x = 5, y = 10, z = 35 in BA 24, t(31) = 6.81, p < 0.0001. 
For the P3a, the comparison between positive and negative feedback (using the low reward 
probability condition when expectancy matched) showed a stronger activation for negative than positive 
feedback within the right superior frontal gyrus (BAs 8-10). This activation was maximal at x = 25, y = 
55, z = 30 in BA 10, t(31) = 3.36, p = 0.02 (see Figure 5E, middle panel). 
For the P3b, this comparison (using both conditions with violated expectancy) revealed a stronger 
activation for negative than positive feedback in the superior frontal gyrus (BAs 6, 8), and was maximal at 
x = -3, y = 30, z = 60 in BA 6, t(31) = 2.55, p = 0.007 (see Figure 5E, lower panel). 
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4. Discussion  
PM is instrumental in fostering goal-adaptive behavior (Ullsperger et al., 2014). It entails the swift 
detection of mismatches between goal and action (at the FRN level), and subsequently, the updating of the 
action value (P3b effect) which is necessary to avoid error commission in the future and to learn new 
contingencies in the environment, and in this way to improve self-regulation and control (Inzlicht et al., 
2014). However, whether the FRN reflects a signed RPE (i.e., worse-than-expected event mostly) or an 
unsigned RPE (i.e, either worse- or better-than-expected events, irrespective of the direction) remains 
debated in the literature. Likewise, it is still somewhat unclear how action value is updated at the P3b level 
after a mismatch between goal and action is processed at the FRN level.  
To address these two questions, we devised an experiment in which worse-than-expected or 
better-than-expected outcomes were artificially created and compared to yoked conditions for which 
actual and expected outcome did not conflict with each other. The behavioral results showed that our 
manipulation of expectancy was successful: Participants’ reports of feedback expectancy after each 
condition closely followed the instructions provided to them prior to task execution. This expectancy 
either matched or mismatched with the actual feedback participants received in the Go/NoGo task in 
different blocks and which was based on the objective reward probability (see Figures 2A and 2B). 
Moreover, participants reported worse-than-expected outcomes (i.e., negative feedback provided after 
action execution although a positive feedback was expected for it) to be overall more informative than 
better-than-expected outcomes (i.e., positive feedback provided after action execution whereas negative 
outcome was anticipated for it), suggesting an asymmetry in the strength of the mismatch detection 
between goal and action at the subjective level.  
However and importantly, the ERP results clearly showed that the FRN was larger when outcome 
and expectancy mismatched with each other compared to when they did not, but the direction of this 
violation did not matter. This early feedback-locked ERP activity was reliably larger for negative 
compared to positive feedback, and this was true regardless of whether the outcome was either worse or 
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better than expected. This unsigned RPE captured by the FRN was followed by a differential action value 
updating at the P3b level, whereby positive feedback was associated with a larger activity than negative 
feedback, but again, this effect occurred irrespective of the direction of the violation between outcome and 
expectancy. Finally, we also found an unexpected P3a effect for one condition only: When reward 
probability was low and reward expectancy was aligned with it, negative feedback led to a larger P3a 
compared to positive feedback. Here after, we discuss the implications of our new findings for 
neurobiological models of PM in greater detail.  
4.1. Unsigned RPE at the FRN level 
An important contribution of the current study to the existing literature is the demonstration that the FRN 
component is involved in the rapid detection of mismatches between expectancy and outcome, but 
irrespective of their direction: If the outcome deviates from expectancy, then a large FRN is elicited (see 
Figures 3, 5A&B). Previous EEG studies already reported larger FRN for negative relative to positive 
performance feedback (Miltner et al., 1997; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; von Borries et al., 2013), and for 
unexpected compared to expected events (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2007; Pfabigan et al., 
2011). Our new results confirm the roles of valence and expectedness but suggest that expectedness must 
be understood as unsigned expectedness in line with the salience processing account (Hauser et al., 2014; 
Soder & Potts, 2018; Talmi et al., 2013) and not as signed expectedness in line with the reinforcement 
learning framework (Holroyd & Coles, 2002).  
This salience effect during PM is probably supported by dopaminergic activity that arises within 
the basal ganglia and the striatum (Schultz, 2016; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Ullsperger et al., 
2014) and spreads to the dACC where the FRN is eventually generated (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; 
Miltner et al., 1997). This, in turn, enables the rapid trial-by-trial detection of a potential mismatch 
between outcome and expectancy. This detection is thus deemed ‘low level’, and carries certain features 
of automaticity (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). The assumption that the FRN may reflect unsigned RPEs 
during PM, and is thereby mostly driven by salience or surprise, is not new, but backed up by a series of 
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neuroscientific studies (e.g. Alexander & Brown, 2011; Oliveira et al., 2007), including in animals 
(Hayden, Heilbronner, Pearson, & Platt, 2011). For example, using a probabilistic learning task, Hauser et 
al. (2014) concluded that the FRN is associated with surprise signals and absolute (and not signed) RPEs. 
Likewise, Soder and Potts (2018) and Talmi et al. (2013) both reported ERP results suggesting that the 
FRN reflects an unsigned RPE rather than a signed RPE, and that it has similar spatio-temporal properties 
and is even functionally equivalent for both worse- and better-than-expected outcomes. Recently, van der 
Veen and collaborators (2016) showed that unexpected social judgments yielded larger FRNs when 
compared to correctly predicted ones. This result likewise suggests that the FRN is sensitive to salience 
rather than signed RPEs. In sum, our new ERP findings are compatible with this broad literature. 
However, they also add to it because the experimental design that we devised was able to manipulate the 
relevant factors in a clean and transparent manner. Unlike these earlier ERP studies, we used a simple 
Go/NoGo task in which reward probability and reward expectancy were manipulated using a stringent 
within-subjects design. As a result, the four main conditions had similar stimuli and task demands but 
nevertheless led to different behavioral performances and expectancies. Our design was also devoid of 
learning effects and specific incentives (such as monetary gain or loss). Thus, the systematic amplitude 
variations of the FRN (and P3b) captured across the four conditions in our design could not easily be 
explained by uncontrolled factors, such as motivation, learning or task involvement for instance.  
However, a striking observation is that subjective ratings regarding feedback’s informativeness 
did not align with these FRN results. As it turned out, participants judged unexpected negative feedback as 
the most informative, whereas feedback’s informativeness was lower and balanced for the other 
experimental conditions, including unexpected positive feedback. This dissociation is intriguing as it 
suggests indirectly that these ratings were likely based on different evaluation or monitoring processes 
compared to those involved in the FRN. On the other hand, this dissociation is perhaps not so surprising 
considering that this ERP component is thought to reflect a rather automatic evaluation of the feedback 
performed by the dACC, right after its onset (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), and presumably, this effect may 
not be readily accessible to introspection. Our supplementing source localization results also clearly 
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corroborated the involvement of the dACC in the generation of the FRN recorded in our study, but not in 
the generation of the P3a or P3b. The involvement of the dACC in the generation of the FRN as observed 
here, accords well with previous EEG studies (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997; Yeung 
et al., 2004), as well as with studies using combined EEG-fMRI techniques (Hauser et al., 2014), or 
neuroimaging only (Oliveira et al., 2007).  
Moreover, a set of auxiliary analyses showed that this modulation of the FRN with expectancy 
was mostly driven by the positive rather than the negative feedback. Because positive feedback and more 
specifically, reward is associated with a distinctive ERP component, known as the Reward Positivity 
(Proudfit, 2015), our results suggest indirectly that this reward-related activity could eventually be the one 
that was influenced by expectancy in our study. However, additional studies are needed to assess whether 
it is reward expectancy or rather reward sensitivity that is altered when the outcome (i.e., positive 
feedback) and expectancy mismatch, especially if this outcome denotes either a better- or a worse-than-
expected event. In this context, ERP studies that seek to better characterize the fine-grained spatio-
temporal dynamics of reward processing during feedback-based PM could help disentangle effects of 
valence from expectancy (see Gheza, Paul, & Pourtois, 2018 for a recent attempt). 
A valid objection could be that expectancy or probability already shaped feedback processing 
before the onset of the FRN. To rule out this alternative account, we ran a set of auxiliary analyses during 
the pre-feedback interval (see Supplementary Materials section) where we focused on the Stimulus-
Preceding Negativity (SPN) component, which is sensitive to reward anticipation (Brunia, 1988; Brunia, 
Hackley, van Boxtel, Kotani, & Ohgami, 2011; Brunia & van Boxtel, 2001) and feedback informativeness 
(Walentowska et al., 2018). These supplementary results clearly showed that these FRN effects were not 
simply mirrored by earlier SPN effects occurring prior to feedback onset. In line with our previous study 
(Walentowska et al., 2018), we found that the SPN was larger (i.e., more negative) in anticipation of 
positive than negative feedback, but exclusively when positive feedback had a high probability. These 
control analyses therefore support the interpretation that salience influenced feedback processing after its 
onset (at the FRN level) but not prior to it (at the SPN level). 
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4.2. Action value updating at the P3b level  
Our new ERP results also inform about the subsequent updating process, following salience detection at 
the FRN level. A larger P3b for positive than negative feedback (following mismatches between outcome 
and expectancy) suggests that the former was better or more strongly processed than the latter (see Figures 
3, 5A&B). Moreover, when entering VALENCE as additional factor in the statistical model, we found that 
the P3b was selectively reduced for negative feedback when outcome and expectancy mismatched, 
suggesting impaired updating for this specific combination and outcome. In line with previous EEG 
studies that linked the P3b to closure, WM updating, or attention more generally (Donchin & Coles, 1998; 
Polich, 2007; Verleger, 1997; Verleger et al., 1994), we can conclude that positive feedback provided in a 
context of violations between expectancy and outcomes received eventually more weight or attention (e.g. 
facilitated closure and updating) than negative feedback. An important additional contribution of our study 
is to show that this gating effect at the P3b level happens to occur regardless of whether the positive 
feedback was a worse- or better-than-expected event. Hence, similar to the FRN, our results for the P3b 
suggest a decoupling between the specific information value carried by the evaluative feedback at the 
subjective level (being presumably larger for worse-than-expected compared to better-than-expected 
outcome; see Holroyd & Coles, 2002) and action value updating at the neural level. To be noted, the 
involvement of the P3b in this specific process during PM was already demonstrated in previous EEG 
studies that linked the amplitude of the P3b to information/value updating at the computational level 
(Fischer & Ullsperger, 2013; Ullsperger, 2017; Ullsperger et al., 2014; von Borries et al., 2013).  
Alternatively, this enhanced P3b for positive compared to negative feedback in two contexts in 
which expectancy and outcome mismatched could reflect enhanced goal relevance processing of this 
specific feedback, especially if positive. More specifically, in a recent EEG study, we found that the P3b 
component was systematically larger for evaluative feedback deemed goal relevant for participants 
(Walentowska et al., 2016). Relevance was understood in this study as the degree to which a stimulus was 
informative about the satisfaction status of pursued goals (see also Moors, 2007). Moreover, in another 
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recent EEG study, we found evidence that goal relevance understood as impact increased the P3b during 
PM (Severo et al., 2017, 2018). Impact corresponded to the amount of goal satisfaction that was signaled 
by the feedback stimulus. Hence, it is possible that the P3b was larger for positive feedback in these 
situations where violations occurred because it was more relevant for participants, in the sense of 
informing them swiftly about something important happening, or perhaps having a greater impact for their 
goals. In this framework, action value updating and relevance processing at the P3b level are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Presumably, action value updating could be facilitated by the enhanced 
relevance assigned to the positive feedback when it was delivered in a context where outcome and 
expectancy mismatched with each other.  
Unexpectedly, apart from the P3b updating effect, another and earlier valence effect was observed 
after the FRN at the same fronto-central locations, and thereby sharing many similarities with a P3a ERP 
component. Specifically, when reward probability was low and there was no mismatch between outcome 
and expectancy, negative feedback gave rise to a much larger P3a than positive feedback in this context. 
Obviously, this effect cannot translate a simple oddball effect (Polich, 2007) given that negative feedback 
was not deviant in this condition, on the contrary. Unlike the FRN and P3b components, this P3a effect 
was not ‘unsigned’ or explained by salience, but actually found for a single combination of probability and 
expectancy only, namely when low reward probability and low reward expectancy converged (see Figures 
4A and 5C). Some hints on the possible role of the P3a during PM were already provided by Ullsperger 
and colleagues (2014), suggesting that the P3a could be associated with an attention orienting to 
potentially goal-relevant stimuli, before its exact motivational meaning (i.e., whether the stimulus matches 
or mismatches with goals) is extracted later at the P3b level (see here above). When estimating the 
intracranial generators of this P3a effect, we found the superior frontal gyrus to be the main source – a 
result which is in line with older neurophysiological findings that have linked frontal lobe activity to the 
P3 (Baudena, Halgren, Heit, & Clarke, 1995; Halgren, Marinkovic, & Chauvel, 1998). 
Presumably, negative feedback provided in a context where it dominated and was expected by the 
participants (with as a result, a small FRN) unlocked additional attentional or motivational processes that 
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may explain this selective P3a effect. In this condition, participants’ self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982, 1993; 
Bandura & Cervone, 1983) was challenged extensively as they were expecting negative feedback after 
their Go/NoGo decisions, and the outcome confirmed this (i.e., low self-efficacy). This situation, although 
not associated with a violation between expectancy and outcome, was probably associated with a high 
level of negative affect and/or frustration, facilitating in turn the processing of negative feedback at the 
P3a level in this condition. Although this assumption awaits validation at the empirical level, our new 
results for the P3a and P3b suggest that PM brain mechanisms are highly flexible, exploiting in a dynamic 
and context-sensitive manner the evidence available after feedback onset to monitor and update action 
value. As our new results indirectly suggest, this process could very well occur earlier in time for negative 
information when it met expectancy (at the P3a level), compared to the processing of positive information, 
which was globally enhanced at later stage when expectancy was violated (P3b level). 
4.3. Limitations 
A few limitations warrant comment. First, we considered reward probabilities of 33% as low and 
of 50% as high. It could be argued that these percentages reflect low or intermediate levels instead. 
Moreover, it could be objected that uncertainty (which is larger for 50% than a 33% reward probability), 
rather than reward probability (see Mushtaq, Bland, & Schaefer, 2011; Yu & Dayan, 2005), was the main 
difference between our conditions. However, a previous ERP study already reported that the FRN and 
P300 scaled up with unexpectedness rather than uncertainty (Kogler, Sailer, Derntl, & Pfabigan, 2017), 
suggesting that the former variable likely accounted for the systematic amplitude modulation of the FRN 
(and P3) seen in the current study. Moreover, we chose these specific reward probabilities (and specific 
task setting for the RT deadline) based on many previous EEG studies that already validated them using 
the same Go/NoGo task (see Aarts & Pourtois, 2012; Koban et al., 2012; Severo et al., 2017, 2018; Vocat 
et al., 2008; Walentowska et al., 2016), and reported clear-cut FRN and P3b effects. In addition, the 
behavioral results and subjective ratings (see Figure 2) both confirmed that we created four different 
conditions that could indeed be discriminated from one another based on the match or mismatch between 
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reward probability and reward expectancy. Notwithstanding these elements, it appears important to 
explore in future studies the neural processing of matches vs. mismatches between reward probability and 
expectancy, with tasks yielding higher reward probabilities than in the present experiment if possible.  
Second, in the current study, we did not include a baseline condition without instructions about 
the reward probabilities to be expected because we did not want to increase the already long duration of 
our experiment. However, in order to replicate and extend the amplitude change of the FRN (and P3b) 
with expectancy, it would be important in future ERP studies to add such a control condition. This would 
probably allow to more easily disentangle the contribution of subjective (i.e., expectancy) from objective 
(i.e., probability) effects on the FRN and P3b levels.  
Third, our main manipulation check for reward expectancy was probably not ‘pure’ and 
contaminated by social desirability or memory effects. It was important to confirm, via specific questions 
asked to the participants, that they actually followed the instructions given to them beforehand, and hence 
eventually ‘remembered’ afterwards the reward probability (either low or high) that was expected in a 
specific condition. However, this procedure may have hindered the possibility to find a significant effect 
of reward probability, besides expectancy, on these subjective ratings. To overcome this limitation, we 
suggest using different and more implicit manipulation checks in future studies if possible, which would 
probably allow to more objectively capture effects of both expectancy and reward probability during the 
monitoring of positive vs. negative performance feedback. 
4.4. Conclusions  
The current study showed that when a simple Go/NoGo task was used, the FRN component, generated in 
the dACC, captured unsigned RPEs during PM and could be interpreted as driven by salience or surprise. 
Intriguingly, participants rated the worse-than-expected outcome as the most informative one, suggesting 
a dissociation between self-report and ERP results. Moreover, the P3b component was larger for positive 
than negative feedback, if and only if mismatches between expectancy and outcome occurred, irrespective 
of their direction. These results suggest that action value updating at the P3b level was stronger for 
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positive than negative outcomes, and probably generic. However, when negative feedback prevailed and 
this dominance was anticipated by the participants, we found that it was processed more strongly than 
positive feedback at the P3a level, suggesting that negative information can guide action value updating or 
monitoring at an earlier stage than positive information, for which a P3b effect was found. All in all, these 
new ERP results are not only compatible with current neurobiological models of PM (e.g. Ullsperger et 
al., 2014), but they can also serve to inform them about the specific combination of task-specific (i.e., 
reward probability) and subject-dependent (i.e., reward expectancy) factors that can influence the speed 
and efficiency of PM. 
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Figure 1. Trial structure. At response onset (speeded Go/NoGo task), a colored frame (blue or magenta) 
appeared around the target and stayed on screen until feedback offset, signaling either low or high reward 
expectancy. Irrespective of reward expectancy, reward probability was also either low or high, resulting in 
four conditions in our study when crossing these two factors. In two conditions, reward expectancy was 
violated with action outcomes, while in the two other ones – action outcomes matched reward expectancy. 
Note that the current trial illustrates a correct and fast response to a Go stimulus (i.e., below the arbitrary 
response deadline), followed by a positive feedback (green dot). If the response was correct but too slow 
(i.e., above the arbitrary response deadline), then a negative feedback (red dot) was shown instead.  
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Figure 2. Behavioral results. (A) Manipulation checks of reward expectancy (based on VAS scales). After 
each condition, participants reported the proportion of positive vs. negative feedback received during the 
last three blocks. Results showed that these estimations closely followed the instructions and hence reward 
expectancy, but were not influenced by reward probability. (B) In comparison, when looking at the actual 
task data, results showed that the number of positive and negative feedbacks (following fast and slow hits, 
respectively), closely followed the specific reward probability (being either low or high) used in each of 
the two conditions. Reward expectancy did not influence this outcome. Note that for (A) scores can vary 
from 0 (not expected at all) to 100 (expected a lot), and for (A) and (B) error bars represent standard errors 
of the mean (SEM). The following rule was used in condition naming in (A) probability_EXPECTANCY; 
and in (B) PROBABILITY_expectancy. 
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Figure 3. Feedback-locked grand average ERP waveforms, recorded from fronto-central electrodes (Fz 
and FCz pooled together; left panel) for the FRN (250–300ms) and P3a (350–470 ms), and non-
overlapping centro-parietal locations (CPz and Pz pooled together; right panel) for the P3b (350–600 ms 
post-feedback onset). (A) ERPs when low reward expectancy was violated (i.e., outcome was better than 
expected). (B) ERPs when high expectancy was violated (i.e., outcome was worse than expected). For 
both conditions, a large and similar FRN (being more negative for negative than positive feedback) and a 
large P3b (being more positive for positive than negative feedback) were recorded. Note that F stands for 
feedback onset, significant effects are highlighted in grey, and negativity is plotted upwards. 
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Figure 4. Feedback-locked grand average ERP waveforms, recorded from fronto-central electrodes (Fz 
and FCz pooled together; left panel) for the FRN (250–300 ms) and P3a (350–470 ms), and centro-parietal 
locations (CPz and Pz pooled together; right panel) for the P3b (350–600 ms post-feedback onset). (A) 
ERPs when low reward expectancy was aligned with low reward probability. (B) ERPs when high reward 
expectancy was matched with high reward probability. Only when both reward probability and reward 
expectancy were low (see panel A), a distinctive P3a was elicited for negative compared to positive 
feedback. Note that F stands for feedback onset, significant effects are highlighted in grey, and negativity 
is plotted upwards. 
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Figure 5. Horizontal topographical maps of the feedback-locked ERP data, separately for each condition. 
Each map shows the ERP difference wave obtained after subtracting positive from negative feedback (see 
also blue line in Figures 3 and 4) during a 100-milisecond time interval (mean activity) (A) when low 
reward expectancy was violated, (B) when high reward expectancy was violated, (C) when low reward 
expectancy was confirmed, and (D) when high reward expectancy was confirmed. Note that the main ERP 
effects are marked with a frame. (E) Source-localization results (computed using sLORETA) for the three 
main ERP components recorded in this study: FRN (upper panel), P3a (middle panel), and P3b (lower 
panel; see the text for details). 
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Supplementary Materials 
Power analysis 
Using G*Power, the following parameters were selected: (i) ‘F tests’ were chosen as Test family; (ii) 
‘ANOVA: Repeated measures, within factors’ was chosen as Statistical test; (iii) ‘A priori: Compute 
required sample size – given α, power, and effect size’ was chosen as a Type of power analyses; (iv) ‘as in 
SPSS’ was chosen during Effect size specification in Options; (v) Effect size f(U) was calculated and 
transferred to the main window using the direct option (ηp
2
) after inserting a value of 0.159 (as based on 
Walentowska et al., 2016); (vi) α was set up at 0.05 level; (vii) Power was set up at 0.95 level; (viii) 
number of groups was defined as 1; (ix) number of measurements was defined as 4; (x) after calculations, 
a total sample size of 33 was estimated. Original G*Power outputs are presented below. 
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[1] -- Wednesday, June 26, 2019 -- 21:50:29 
F tests - ANOVA: Repeated measures, within factors 
Analysis: A priori: Compute required sample size  
Input: Effect size f(U) = 0.4348110 
 α err prob = 0.05 
 Power (1-β err prob) = 0.95 
 Number of groups = 1 
 Number of measurements = 4 
 Nonsphericity correction ε = 1 
Output: Noncentrality parameter λ = 18.1498181 
 Critical F = 2.6993926 
 Numerator df = 3.0000000 
 Denominator df = 96.0000000 
 Total sample size = 33 
 Actual power = 0.9529310 
 
 
 
ERP analysis controlling for the imbalance in the trial count between conditions  
We performed an auxiliary analysis where we balanced trial number between conditions to ascertain that 
amplitude variations of the FRN as a function of valence, probability and expectancy could not be 
explained by asymmetries in the signal-to-noise ratio between them. More specifically, during EEG data 
pre-processing (BrainVision Analyzer 2.0 software), we selected a subset of the (clean) epochs available 
for the negative feedback condition (by means of a standard odd-even selection procedure) and to be 
included in the averages, eventually matching this trial number with that of the positive feedback 
condition.  
As a result, when reward expectancy was high but the outcome deviated (i.e., worse-than-
expected event), the number of negative feedback included in the averages decreased from M = 59.89 (SD 
= 2.13) to M = 30.13 (SD = 3.12), eventually reaching a similar amount of trials than for the positive 
feedback condition, M = 29.51 (SD = 1.52). In a similar vein, when reward expectancy was low and 
reward probability too, this selection procedure made it possible to decrease the number of negative 
feedback included in the averages from M = 61.11 (SD = 2.44) to M = 31.81 (SD = 2.74), thereby 
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matching trial count with the positive feedback condition, M = 30.23 (SD = 2.52). The corresponding 
waveforms are presented in Figures S1 and S2. As can be seen from them, balancing trial number between 
conditions did not change the morphology and amplitude of the FRN, where a clear modulation by 
valence and expectancy was still observed, and was highly comparable to the ones reported when this 
matching was not performed (compare panel A and B). 
[insert Figure S1 and S2 here] 
 
Figure S1. Feedback-locked grand average ERPs, recoded from electrodes Fz and FCz (pooled together), 
for the condition where high reward expectancy was violated. (A) The processing of negative feedback is 
compared with positive feedback, when all trials available for each condition are considered and included 
in the averages. For negative feedback, the averages were based on twice more trials than those for 
positive feedback. (B) A very similar waveform is obtained for negative feedback when a subset of trials 
is considered in order to match the trial count with the positive feedback condition. 
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Figure S2. Feedback-locked grand average ERPs, recoded from electrodes (Fz and FCz pooled together), 
for the low reward expectancy-low reward probability condition. (A) The processing of negative feedback 
is compared with positive feedback, when all trials available for each condition are considered and 
included in the averages. For negative feedback, the averages were based on twice more trials than those 
for positive feedback. (B) A very similar waveform is obtained for negative feedback when a subset of 
trials is considered in order to match the trial count with the positive feedback condition. 
 
Analysis of the Stimulus Preceding Negativity (SPN) recorded prior to the feedback onset 
The SPN was computed offline following a standard procedure of data transformations (Keil et al., 2014): 
(i) 50-Hz notch filter; (ii) EEG offline referencing using linked mastoids; (iii) -1,000/+1,000 ms 
segmentation around the onset of the feedback stimulus; (iv) pre-feedback interval baseline correction 
(from -1000 ms to -900 ms); (v) vertical ocular correction for blinks (Gratton et al., 1983); (vi) semi-
automatic artifact rejection (trials with motor artifacts were rejected, with a fixed criterion of ±80 μV) 7; 
                                                          
7
 Number of trials kept after artefact rejection and used for averaging were as follows: in the low probability-low 
expectancy (M = 27.12, SD = 2.77 for positive, and M = 58.81, SD = 2.67 for negative feedbacks), in the low 
probability-high expectancy (M = 26.98, SD = 2.52 for positive, and M = 57.89, SD = 2.78 for negative feedbacks), 
in the high probability-high expectancy (M = 48.22, SD = 2.92 for positive, and M = 46.42, SD = 2.72 for negative 
feedbacks), and in the high probability-low expectancy (M = 46.95, SD = 2.62 for positive, and M = 47.07, SD = 
2.43 for negative feedbacks) conditions. The two low reward probability conditions did not differ regarding segments 
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(vii) averaging for each feedback type separately (i.e., positive vs. negative); and (viii) low pass digital 
filtering of the individual average data (30 Hz). The SPN was later defined as the mean voltage within 200 
ms prior to feedback onset, over the left (F3) and right (F4) frontal electrodes. SPN amplitudes for the 
negative feedback were subtracted from the positive feedback (see Luck & Gaspelin, 2017), and the 
resulting/differential SPN amplitude values (positive-negative) were submitted to mixed model ANOVAs 
with the within-subject factors reward EXPECTANCY (low vs. high), reward PROBABILITY (low vs. 
high), and ELECTRODE (F3 vs. F4). 
The ANOVA only showed significant main effects of PROBABILITY, F(1,31) = 4.92, p = 0.038, 
ηp
2 
= 0.186, and ELECTRODE, F(1,31) = 7.89, p = 0.009, ηp
2 
= 0.203. All other main or interaction effects 
were non-significant (all ps > 0.295). The main effect of PROBABILITY showed a larger SPN when 
reward probability was high (M = -1.81 μV, SD = 1.98) in comparison to when it was low (M = -0.87 μV, 
SD = 2.11). Importantly, as indicated by the non-significant EXPECTANCY x PROBABILITY 
interaction, reward probability modulated SPN amplitudes in a general manner, irrespective of reward 
expectancy. The main effect of ELECTRODE indicated a larger SPN component over right (M = -1.82 
μV, SD = 2.12) versus left frontal location (M = -0.86 μV, SD = 1.18) (see Figure S3). 
[insert Figure S3 here] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
kept for positive, t(31) = -1.22, p = 0.414, nor negative feedback, t(31) = -1.03, p = 0.551. Likewise, the two high 
reward probability conditions had similar number of trials retained after artifact rejection for positive, t(31) = -0.97, p 
= 0.457, and negative feedback, t(31) = 0.67, p = 0.634. 
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Figure S3. Pre-feedback onset ERP effects, with a focus on the SPN, from F3 and F4 electrodes. (A) Only 
when reward probability was high (regardless of reward expectancy), the SPN component was 
significantly larger (more negative) in anticipation of positive than negative feedback. Note that R stands 
for response onset, and F for feedback onset. The time window of interest (-200/0 ms) is framed, and 
negativity is plotted upwards. (B) Topographical maps (horizontal view) of the SPN (mean ERP activity 
computed during 200 ms prior to the feedback onset). Each map shows the ERP difference wave obtained 
when negative feedback was subtracted from positive feedback. Note that a clear SPN was only visible for 
high compared to low reward probability conditions, and was larger over right than left frontal locations. 
